




In 1957, a writer called John Andrews stole my proverbial thunder. He published an 
article called ‘Antarctic geopolitics’ in the journal, Australian Outlook, and it makes for 
intriguing reading some six decades later.1 I never had the pleasure of meeting Andrews 
but it would have been instructive, for me at least, to talk with him about how our mutual 
understandings of both geopolitics and Antarctica might have aligned with one another 
or not. Assuming he was writing in 1956 or early 1957, he was writing at an interesting 
time for both subject areas.
In the case of geopolitics, for example, established scholars such as Richard Hartshorne 
were urging a new generation of political geographers to avoid the term ‘geopolitics’, 
positing the claim that it was an ‘intellectual poison’. What poisoned this academic field 
was a deeply felt unease that an association with Nazi Germany and Nazism had forever 
tainted geopolitics as both thought and practice. Hartshorne urged his fellow geogra-
phers to seek solace in mainstream political geography, and the emerging scholarly fields 
of quantitative and behavioural geography.2 What was interesting, however, was that 
non- geographers were still willing to use the term ‘geopolitics’ in their analyses of world 
affairs – and that in Latin America geopolitics was widely taught in military colleges and 
universities.3
Andrews was also writing at an interesting time in Antarctic history. In 1957, the Soviet 
satellite Sputnik and the onset of the International Geophysical Year (IGY 1957–8) mani-
fested a new era of scientific inquiry.4 The IGY was an extraordinary and intense period 
of international scientific investigation in Antarctica and other areas such as the oceans 
and the upper atmosphere, which transformed understanding of the polar continent 
and its relationship to planet Earth and the planetary system. It was as if  the earth itself  
was placed under scientific scrutiny and surveillance.5 Andrews sensed that change was 
afoot and that the geopolitical and the geophysical were co- constituted.6 As he remarked, 
‘The discovery of any deposits that exist may not be an impossible task by geophysical 
methods even through considerable thicknesses of ice, and the success of methods of 
mining in north polar latitudes, as in Alaska and Spitsbergen, suggests that it may not be 
impossible to develop methods that would be technically successful in Antarctica.’7 Was 
strategic interest in Antarctica (and its resources) rising among interested nations because 
scientific understanding of the ice sheet, underlying geology, and marine biology of the 
Southern Ocean was expanding? Did this help explain why twelve countries were involved 
in IGY Antarctic programmes on the one hand and on the other hand account for why 
India raised the ‘Question of Antarctica’ in the UN in 1956?8 Was there a need for a new 
political regime for Antarctica in the face of an uncertain future?9
In his summation, Andrews posited an interesting aside about what we might think of 
as anticipatory Antarctic geopolitics:
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The political geography of Antarctica is, therefore, a very short story in terms of time, but it 
is a story which is rapidly becoming more complicated and demanding more attention in inter-
national circles . . . interests being affirmed today in case the economic, scientific, political or 
strategic importance of the continent should substantially increase in the future. Much of the 
present discussion, therefore, is in terms of what ‘might be’ rather than ‘what is’.10
His use of words such as ‘might be’ and ‘what is’ raise interesting questions about possible 
futures for Antarctica – some desirable and some perhaps to be best avoided. Some might 
in turn be more demanding in Andrews’s words of political and popular attention, while 
others barely register.
In this chapter, I offer a dialogue with three different forms of ‘Antarctic geopolitics’. 
The first one I term an anticipatory Antarctic geopolitics, which peaked just before the 
negotiations leading to the 1959 Antarctic Treaty. A further manifestation deferring 
Antarctic geopolitics is my second strand and finally, a more contemporary variant, of 
what I suggest is resilient Antarctic geopolitics. Where I find overlap, and this is developed 
in the concluding section, is a series of anticipatory logics (for example, pre- emption, 
preparedness, resilience) and the manner in which the Antarctic is subject to a series 
of ‘demanding geopolitics’.11 The ‘demands’ may be varied but what unites them is a 
portfolio of demands placed on the continent and surrounding oceans by claimant, semi- 
claimant, and non- claimant states, environmental organizations, fishing syndicates, and 
international governmental organizations such as the UN. The implications are to bring 
to the fore not only how the Antarctic is understood geographically, but also the kind of 
governance projects it is enrolled in.
ANTICIPATING ANTARCTIC GEOPOLITICS
In his 1957 essay, Andrews does not offer a definition of geopolitics, and nor does he dwell 
much on why the term might have intellectual and political purchase. In fact, the terms 
‘geopolitics’ and ‘political geography’ are used inter- changeably. It is assumed, I think, 
that the ‘geopolitical’ and the ‘political geographical’ refer to things and themes such as 
resources, strategy, and access to the Antarctic. In that sense, his insights chime with a 
longer tradition of classical geopolitical thought. From its earliest inceptions in the 1890s, 
geopolitical writers were concerned with the power of the ‘geo’, the role of the physical 
geographies of the earth, such as land, sea, and ice, to shape political power.12 Another 
classical geopolitical theme that finds favour in Andrews’s article is the sense in which 
states compete with one another to secure strategic advantage, including through control 
of material resources, even in and over areas that might be considered to be quite remote 
from the dominant centres of population and political- economic power.
However, one thing that is worth noting at this stage is that Andrews was an Australian 
citizen and a branch president of the New South Wales section of the Australian Institute 
of International Affairs. As an Australian writer, his geographical outlook was profoundly 
shaped by a sense of geographical proximity of Australia to the polar continent and its 
seas.13 As he opined, ‘It is not always remembered that it is only a little over two  thousand 
miles from Sydney to the nearest Antarctic coast, very little further from Sydney to 
Darwin. So far as the main concentration of the Australian population is concerned, 
those living south- east of a line joining Brisbane and Adelaide, Antarctica is a closer 
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neighbour than Asia.’14 This sense of nearness was replicated elsewhere in the southern 
hemisphere, especially in the public and political cultures of three other claimant states: 
Argentina, Chile, and New Zealand. But it also serves as a cultural as well as a geographi-
cal register. Serving one might argue to divorce Australia and Australians from Asia and 
Asians, and indirectly extenuating the connections, both imaginative and genealogical, 
with Britain and its dominions.
As was well understood by the mid- to late 1950s, the geopolitics of the Antarctic was 
contested.15 This was not just a representational struggle – a battle of rival geopolitical 
imaginations and lines on the polar map. It was also a battle over things and practices. 
In the 1940s, Britain, Argentina, Chile, and the United States were undertaking a series 
of activities that required men and objects – such as aircraft planes, flags, base huts, 
and helicopters – to perform mapping, charting, photographing, and dwelling in the 
Antarctic. Antarctic geopolitics was embodied, performance- based, and affective in the 
sense that those actions and movements across polar land, sea, and sky were designed to 
inspire and reassure distant capitals that their respective countries’ interests were being 
enhanced in the process.16 Antarctic geopolitics, therefore, was something that was made 
and re- made, and the capacity for surprise and uncertainty was never far away. The physi-
cal agency of the Antarctic itself  meant that ships got lost, planes were grounded due to 
bad weather, and signs of human ‘effective occupation’ could be literally blown away by 
wind and snow.17
In 1948, a British civil servant based in Argentina named Bill Hunter Christie published 
a book called The Antarctic Problem.18 Apart from an apt title, it captured the polar zeit-
geist, reviewing the past in order to speculate on a possible polar future punctuated by 
rising tension and territorial competition. By the late 1940s, seven states were claimants 
to the polar continent and surrounding ocean – Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, New 
Zealand, Norway, and the UK. As the list suggests, on the face of it some states were 
considerably closer in geodetic terms to the Antarctic than others. For the four ‘southern’ 
states, their Antarctic territories were represented as integral parts of their national ter-
ritory with ports and cities, such as Adelaide, Punta Arenas, Ushuaia, and Wellington, 
imagined as polar ‘gateways’. Argentina, Britain, and Chile were overlapping claimants.
In the same year that Hunter Christie penned his reflections on Antarctic sovereignty 
politics, President Gabriel González Videla of Chile made a visit to the Chilean Antarctic 
Territory in the midst of the first Chilean Antarctic Expedition (1947–8). He went there 
explicitly to endorse a Chilean Antarctic claim and officially opened the recently con-
structed base, the General Bernardo O’Higgins station. As he noted in his inauguration 
speech, ‘To all in Chile, which I am certain is dwelling on this memorable act, I award 
this land of tomorrow, sure that its people will know how to maintain energetically the 
sovereignty and unity of our territory from Arica [in the far north of Chile close to 
the Bolivian/Peru borderlands] to the South Pole.’19 In so doing, he became the world’s 
first head of state to visit Antarctica and the first to urge his fellow citizens to commit 
to the task of protecting Chilean Antarctic territory in the name of tomorrow. Named 
after the hero of nineteenth- century Chilean independence, the O’Higgins station was a 
reminder of how the Chilean political and military establishment viewed Antarctica as a 
frontier space of Chilean territorial nationalism, and one that had an anticipatory geopo-
litical dimension. Starting with legal and political decrees, Chilean authorities assembled 
documents, speeches, books, maps, materials, scientists, infrastructure, and even the body 
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of the president to anticipate possible challenges to their polar sovereignty. Ever since 
a presidential decree from November 1940, the Chilean national territory was defined 
as the area between 53 degrees longitude west and 90 degrees longitude west including 
‘all lands, islands, reefs, glaciers, and pack ice, and others, known or unknown, and the 
respective territorial sea’. The Chilean Antarctic Territory was enrolled into the provincial 
administrative structure and said to be part of ‘Magellan and Chilean Antarctica’ with 
the capital based in Port Williams. And new generations of school children were educated, 
via geography and history lessons, into understanding that their country inherited its 
southerly territories from imperial Spain and a fifteenth- century papal decree, and thus it 
was reasonable for the country to extend beyond the southerly point of South America.
Chilean military geographers such as Canas Montalva vigorously advanced this new 
Chilean geopolitical imagination, which envisioned a country no longer constrained by 
the mountainous geographies of the Andes and the South American coastline with the 
Pacific Ocean. In the Chilean journal, Revista Geografia de Chile, Montalva and col-
leagues such as Pedro Ihl were tireless advocates of Chilean Antarctic Territory and the 
role that Chile must play in defending its interests, albeit in a Cold War era where the 
United States and its Latin American allies were ever eager to strengthen hemispheric 
solidarity in the face of anxieties about the challenge posed by the Soviet Union. In the 
view expressed by the Chilean Foreign Minister Alberto Sepulveda in February 1958, 
‘There is an American Antarctica, which is an integral part of the western hemisphere . . . 
The Antarctic territory of Chile is part of the security zone [as defined by the 1947 Rio 
Treaty of Inter- American Reciprocal Assistance] . . . Our country holds the oldest rights 
of sovereignty on this territory, as established in the first place by repeated provisions and 
mandates from Spain and then later, through our life as a Republic.’20
In this more expansive era, Chile was a self- declared ‘maritime and polar state’ whereby 
its outer limits would stretch over vast areas of the Pacific and the Antarctic continent. In 
this new vista, Chile would extend all the way to the South Pole itself  mindful of how that 
geographical stretching fitted into Cold War regional security architectures. As Article 4 
of the 1947 Rio Treaty notes:
The region to which this Treaty refers is bounded as follows: beginning at the North Pole; thence 
due south to a point 74 degrees north latitude, 10 degrees west longitude; thence by a rhumb line 
to a point 47 degrees 30 minutes north latitude, 50 degrees west longitude; thence by a rhumb 
line to a point 35 degrees north latitude, 60 degrees west longitude; thence due south to a point in 
20 degrees north latitude; thence by a rhumb line to a point 5 degrees north latitude, 24 degrees 
west longitude; thence due south to the South Pole; thence due north to a point 30 degrees 
south latitude, 90 degrees west longitude; thence by a rhumb line to a point on the Equator at 97 
degrees west longitude; thence by a rhumb line to a point 15 degrees north latitude, 120 degrees 
west longitude; thence by a rhumb line to a point 50 degrees north latitude, 170 degrees east 
longitude; thence due north to a point in 54 degrees north latitude; thence by a rhumb line to 
a point 65 degrees 30 minutes north latitude, 168 degrees 58 minutes 5 seconds west longitude: 
thence due north to the North Pole.
So, in short, a combination of imperial inheritance, geographical proximity, and Cold 
War geopolitical alliance- building combined to inculcate a passionate commitment to the 
notion that Chile extended southwards and eastwards.
These appeals to geographical proximity and geological continuity, which Argentine 
geopolitical thinkers also noted approvingly, were powerful factors in making this vision 
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compelling, at least to Chilean and Argentine citizens. Argentina and Chile found 
common geopolitical cause when it came to their polar territories and advocated a distinct 
sector called the ‘South American Antarctic’ in 1948, which could usefully distinguish 
itself  from their counter- claimant and imperial rival, the UK. It also helped to solidify 
Antarctic geopolitics. Maps and books, coupled with claims to proximity and continuity 
helped to buttress the inherently lively and unpredictable qualities of living and working 
let alone claiming territory in the Antarctic itself  – one might describe that as a particular 
‘Antarctic problem’.21
But the ‘Antarctic problem’ that Hunter Christie posited pivoted around the notion 
that three states claimed the same area of the Antarctic as part of their national territory 
(Argentina, Chile, and the UK), and others such as the United States and then later the 
Soviet Union were not inclined to grant any recognition to those prior claims. It is worth 
noting that the UK could also appeal to geographical proximity as well as past historical 
connections. If  Chile and Argentina could point to an ‘imperial inheritance’ from Spain, 
a papal decree that declared that half  of the world could be explored and conquered by 
the Spanish monarchy, then Britain could point to a historical association with Antarctica 
stretching over two centuries. If  Argentina and Chile could point to geographical proxim-
ity then the UK could look to its occupation of the Falkland Islands and South Georgia 
and cite these islands as ‘polar gateways’.
What gave Antarctic geopolitics zest in the 1950s, moreover, as Andrews recognized, 
was that other southern hemispheric countries (namely Australia and New Zealand) were 
also eager to capitalize and materialize upon their national visions of incorporated polar 
domains. Australia (1933) and New Zealand (1923) were claimants to extensive polar ter-
ritories, the Australian Antarctic Territory (AAT) and the Ross Dependency respectively. 
All four southern countries invoked terms such as geographical proximity, geographical 
fate, geographical fact, polar gateway and geological connection to make manifest their 
sense of themselves as natural and durable polar nations, and all four were committed to 
ensuring that their citizens were enrolled in these national visions.
For Australia, the decade leading up to Andrews’s ruminations on ‘Antarctic  geopolitics’ 
was a busy one. In 1947, the Department of External Affairs established an Antarctic 
Division.22 The decision to create the new division was more than simply an administra-
tive indulgence. It was predicated on the appreciation that Australia’s substantial polar 
claim had not been strengthened since the introduction of an administrative act of formal 
incorporation in 1933. As with other claimants, the post- 1945 era ushered into existence 
a great need to perform ‘Antarctic geopolitics’. In other words, articulating territorial 
visions while necessary would have to be matched increasingly by active labour and deeds. 
If  Chile could muster expeditions and a presidential visit then what might others have to 
offer in their quest to find ways to consolidate territorial claims. The Australian cabinet 
agreed in 1947 to fund new expeditions and base building projects incorporating sub- 
Antarctic islands and the AAT. Even in 1948, Australian officials were already warning 
government ministers that the southern fringes of Australia might be vulnerable to rocket 
attacks by hostile forces.
Antarctic geopolitics in this rendition were changing, and changing fast. Cold War 
geopolitical imaginations were transforming Antarctica. Growing interest from the 
superpowers in the governance arrangements for the polar continent, in combination 
with the imaginative and material power of rockets and missiles, helped to transform and 
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complicate the meaning of words like ‘proximity’. For southern hemispheric nationalists, 
it was a term to imprint into the imaginations of citizens who needed to know and feel 
an affinity for these southerly territories – recognizing them as part of their national ter-
ritories even if  they never visited them.23 While proximity offered connection and integra-
tion, it also raised the less appealing prospect of how others might take advantage if  they 
could establish themselves in comparatively nearby Antarctic spaces. Richard Casey, the 
Australian Foreign Minister, confided to the Canadian High Commissioner in Canberra 
that ‘We do not want the Russians to mount installations in the Antarctic from which they 
can drop missiles on Melbourne or Sydney.’24 That remark was made in 1957 the same 
year Andrews was penning his thoughts on Antarctic geopolitics. Timing was everything.
The period between 1947 and 1957 was highly significant in shaping an anticipatory 
Antarctic geopolitics. Claimant states, southern and northern hemispheric alike, watched 
anxiously as others mustered their imaginative and material resources. The role of the 
superpowers was foundational as they had the resources to move about, to settle in and 
even to imagine different Antarctic futures. The United States was instrumental in propos-
ing the IGY and in leading the negotiations over the future governance of the Antarctic. 
The Soviet Union (and in a more modest role India) was resolute in ensuring that it was 
not excluded from any international scientific and political enterprises affecting the polar 
continent. Australian anxieties only increased when it became apparent that the Soviet 
Union, as part of its IGY polar programme, was determined to establish scientific sta-
tions in the AAT. Whatever its private reservations, the Australian government was in 
no position to protest about this concentration of scientific power. Under the terms and 
conditions of the IGY, this veritable ‘scientific Olympics’ was to be devoid of concerns 
about who claimed which part of the Antarctic as their national territory.
Painful as it might have been, the latest iteration of Antarctic geopolitics in 1957 was 
one in which scientific internationalism, Cold War geopolitics and territorial nationalism 
made for awkward bedfellows. As a physical setting for all of this, the material geogra-
phies of the Antarctic were anything but inert. The ice and snow themselves were enrolled 
in these geopolitical articulations. What could be buried under ice? Could rockets be 
secretly installed and launched? Were submarines secretly patrolling the ice- filled waters 
off  the polar continent? As with the Arctic region, journalists and politicians alike were 
quite capable of investing tremendous possibilities for intrigue and suspicion. It was not 
just charlatans and conspiracy theorists at work here. Respectable newspapers, such as 
the New York Times in September 1959, were quite capable of imagining a world where 
the Soviet Union would need to be prevented from turning the Antarctic into a ‘Soviet 
Albania’ and using it to establish launch pads which might imperil the entire southern 
hemisphere.25 Andrews, by way of contrast, was quite modest when it came to imagining 
what geopolitical future might materialize in Antarctica.
The negotiations leading to the 1959 Antarctic Treaty were painstaking and, at times, 
verged on collapse because of competing futures. Cold War fears of Soviet intrigue 
combined with claimant state intransigence were prominent in this, as was suspicion 
of the United States and what it ‘wanted’ from the Antarctic. In other words, a variety 
of geopolitical ‘demands’ were being hastily assembled in the late 1950s – there were 
demanding actors who did not want to be excluded from any governance negotiations, 
there were demanding issues that were considered to be crucial for some parties, there 
were imaginative demands, and there were hopeful demands that ‘science’ would provide 
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a necessary consensus. As the US State Department official Henry Dater noted, ‘Because 
of its leadership in the Free World, it is evident that the United States could not now 
withdraw from the Antarctic . . . Antarctica simply cannot be separated from the global 
matrix. Science is the shield behind which these activities are carried out.’26 The Antarctic 
Treaty negotiations were as much a scientific- legal intervention as they were geopolitical 
and future- orientated. At stake was something both imaginative and material – how to 
imagine what the polar continent could be like, and how to practice geopolitics in the 
face of an uncertain future? What could be anticipated and could unwelcome futures 
(for example, the Antarctic as Cold War battleground, as nuclear testing site, as resource 
free- for- all) be avoided?
DEFERRING ANTARCTIC GEOPOLITICS
The signing of the Antarctic Treaty on 1 December 1959 is often taken to be a landmark 
event that transformed Antarctic geopolitics in the sense that it provided an overall frame-
work for the original signatories to find a way forward through territorial accommoda-
tion and scientific exchange. The period of ratification was not straightforward, however. 
Claimant states such as Argentina and Chile were slower to endorse than others and, in 
large part, this revolved around a reluctance to embrace a treaty regime that appeared to 
defer their territorial nationalisms.27 The treaty intervened in the ‘foreseeable future’ and 
the negotiators in Washington DC determined which things and objects could be fore-
seen. Article 4 of the Antarctic Treaty, which places to one side the thorny issue of the 
territorial sovereignty of Antarctica, was designed to defer an unwelcome future – a future 
whereby the superpowers and claimant states contested, perhaps violently, matters of pos-
session, dispossession, and non- possession. The apparent neglect of natural resources in 
the treaty negotiations was deliberate in the sense that the issue itself  was considered to 
be politically toxic and likely to inflame the already sensitive issue of sovereignty. So by 
intervening in one area (deferring conflict over territorial sovereignty) it was hoped that 
another area (conflict over resources both living and non- living) could be avoided.
Thus what is interesting about the Antarctic Treaty and what followed from it is its 
relationship to ‘Antarctic futures’. The role of anticipation was crucial as signatories were 
engaged in various mechanisms to defer, to prepare, and even pre- empt uncertainties and 
threats to the treaty and to Antarctica itself. Acting in anticipatory ways was, and indeed 
still is, an integral part of Antarctic geopolitics, as a way of shaping that very future. In 
the face of persistent uncertainty over territorial sovereignty, such active anticipation is 
a necessary pre- condition for regime survival. But addressing those qualms, including 
future uncertainties, has not always been a shared project. Claimant states, for example, 
held views of Antarctica conditioned by their senses of geographical proximity, historic 
connections, and inalienable legal rights. When the original signatories assembled a 
preamble to the Antarctic Treaty, it appealed to a recent past and a shared future vision 
prefaced by the use of the words ‘shall’ and ‘will’:
Recognizing that it is in the interest of all mankind that Antarctica shall continue for ever to be 
used exclusively for peaceful purposes and shall not become the scene or object of international 
discord;
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Acknowledging the substantial contributions to scientific knowledge resulting from international 
cooperation in scientific investigation in Antarctica;
Convinced that the establishment of a firm foundation for the continuation and development 
of such cooperation on the basis of freedom of scientific investigation in Antarctica as applied 
during the International Geophysical Year accords with the interests of science and the progress 
of all mankind;
Convinced also that a treaty ensuring the use of Antarctica for peaceful purposes only and the 
continuance of international harmony in Antarctica will further the purposes and principles 
embodied in the Charter of the United Nations.28
The deferral of the Antarctic geopolitics of the 1950s was achieved by two primary 
mechanisms – regime development and ‘treaty sovereignty’. The first was achieved 
through the regime development epitomized of the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS). As the 
treaty parties developed a basic governing architecture, including a future- facing assem-
blage of biennial meetings, scientific networks, and regular interchange between officials, 
it helped to order spatially and manage temporally the Antarctic region. Legal instru-
ments such as conventions and shared agreements over resources (such as seals, fish, and 
even a deferred one on mineral resources) helped to consolidate claims to solidarities and 
articulations of authority, as well as generating shared understandings of the Antarctic 
itself. A growing membership, including representatives from China, India, and Brazil, in 
a short period of time in the 1980s, was a particularly important development in deferring 
visions of a continent caught up in a new era of resource- driven geopolitical intrigue.
Geographical understandings of Antarctica were significant in this context. In the 
immediate aftermath of the Antarctic Treaty negotiations, it was not uncommon to regard 
the polar continent as a ‘frozen laboratory’. A conceit that not only under- estimated the 
physical agency of the Antarctic but also viewed science as an overwhelmingly palliative 
presence – an assemblage of agents, ideas, objects, and practices, which enabled inter-
national goodwill and exchange.29 Former British scientist and director of the British 
Antarctic Survey Richard Laws was not untypical in claiming that ‘Scientific activi-
ties are relatively non- controversial as had been demonstrated during the International 
Geophysical Year to defuse sovereignty issues.’30 There was a presumption that science in 
the post- Antarctic Treaty era would be able to defuse and indeed defer the more dystopian 
variants of future Antarctic geopolitics.
This sense of defusing sovereignty issues was sorely tested in the 1960s and 1970s when 
it became clear that the Antarctic was not a ‘frozen laboratory’ per se. It was, for many 
parties, a lively place filled with potential both in the here and now and in the future. 
Interest in the region’s resource potential led to new regime developments including the 
Convention on the Conservation on Marine Living Resources (CCMALR, 1980) and 
the deferred Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities 
(CRAMRA 1982–1988), which ultimately failed to secure the necessary support of the 
Treaty Consultative Parties. Regardless of their fate, these conventions coupled with 
growing interest from third parties in the ‘future of Antarctica’ revealed the challenges 
facing the ATS itself.
While it had proven adept at deferring the Antarctic geopolitics of the 1950s, the ATS 
was facing unprecedented challenges about how to respond to the future. It was, of course, 
impossible to predict future outcomes precisely. But for those interested parties, seeking 
to consolidate and indeed preserve the ATS, the awareness of contingency, shock, and 
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uncertainty underwrote calls to develop these new conventions in the hope of providing a 
framework for regulating a resourceful rather than scientific Antarctica. The introduction 
of the conventions was indicative of strategic calculation and imagination; an attempt 
to anticipate and defer possible conflict in the future. While the CRAMRA negotiations 
(1982–1988) ultimately floundered because two of the lead negotiators (Australia and 
France) abandoned plans to develop a future- orientated regime for resource exploitation 
and revenue sharing, the then New Zealand- based chief  negotiator, Chris Beeby, was clear 
in his own mind what was at stake:
The single most important stimulus towards agreed rules was the common judgment that their 
absence might one day lead to a revival, in a very acute and unmanageable form, of the dispute 
about sovereignty put aside by Article IV of and that this could in turn severely undermine the 
Treaty and even lead to its collapse. That judgment – that rules are needed, that the gap in the 
Treaty should be filled – still represents common ground.31
So the revival of an earlier form of Antarctic geopolitics was the stimulus, in Beeby’s 
judgment at least, for CRAMRA as a future- orientated intervention – a measure designed 
to defer the worst possible future (for example, unregulated mining and inter- state 
 conflict) by invoking one where resource exploitation would unfold in a rules- based and 
pacific framework. For others, of course, this future vision was anything but hopeful. 
Environmental organizations, such as Greenpeace, were highly active in contesting this 
vision of the Antarctic as resource space and mobilized geographical counter- imaginaries 
emphasizing a future based on Antarctic wilderness. Their vision was one of permanent 
deferral, in other words, where mineral resource exploitation would never occur in the 
future. Creative practices and interventions such as images of rusty oil drums, scenario 
planning, and public protesting were vital in moving and mobilizing others to embrace 
their future visions. In the midst of that turmoil, growing interest by Third World states 
such as China, India, and Malaysia further inflamed the representational struggles over 
how to understand Antarctica – was it a world park, a resource base, a scientific labora-
tory, a fishing ground, or a legacy of past colonialisms and imperialisms?
The introduction and eventual entry into force of the Protocol on Environmental 
Protection in 1998 was an instrument of deferral. As with the Antarctic Treaty, the ban 
was a mechanism for deferring and blocking unwanted futures. While the measures agreed 
under the Protocol can be revisited and possibly rescinded if  there is sufficient support 
from the parties concerned, the specific ban on mining activities, under Article 7, was 
intended to defer a more immediate and unwelcome future – the collapse of the ATS itself. 
The decision by Australia and France to walk away from the CRAMRA negotiations was 
widely ‘felt’ to be ushering into existence possible ruination of the ATS. Eager to rebuild 
political consensus and revitalize the governance architecture, the Protocol negotiations 
were some of the most testing in the system’s history.
For the seven claimant states and the two semi- claimants (the Soviet Union and the 
United States), Article IV was a deferral and not a denial of their future sovereign inter-
ests in Antarctica. The term ‘treaty sovereignty’ was used to describe a situation whereby 
the parties concerned explored a variety of agents, sites, and objects to consolidate their 
national imaginaries. In Argentina and Chile, for example, in the midst of speculation about 
Antarctica’s growing resource potential, pregnant women were flown down to Antarctic 
bases so that they could give birth to children in Antarctica. Building  genealogical and 
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geopolitical connections with the continent, one might say, in the natal and post- natal 
process. The use of pregnant women as geopolitical agents was a notable intervention in a 
place where women had largely been excluded and marginalized.32 The sites of Antarctic 
geopolitics extended beyond the Antarctic. While the research station helped to consoli-
date an occupying presence, the school, the museum, and the library were also noteworthy 
in archiving, educating, and displaying Antarctic nationalisms. In 1992, Chile exported a 
piece of Antarctic ice to the EXPO in Seville as part of a national exhibition about the 
country and its diverse ecosystems and landscapes. As one author noted:
The decision to search for ice from Antarctica reflects nationalist pride in the territory that dates 
back to the late 1940s. In February 1948, President Gabriel González Videla refused to minimize 
the importance of the claimed land and stated that it was necessary to ‘defend the sovereignty 
and unity of our territory, from Arica to the South Pole’. On May 10 of the previous year, to 
commemorate the claim and reinforce expressions of national identity to celebrate Chile’s ice- 
covered noncontiguous territory, Correos de Chile issued two postage stamps that depicted the 
country’s Antarctic terrain.
 The stamps conveyed a simple yet powerful message: Despite the ongoing territorial disputes, 
Chile owned a piece of Antarctica according to Decree No. 1747, issued on November 6, 1940.33
As scholars such as Jack Child remind us, postage stamps in South America and 
beyond were important geopolitical objects, as banal reminders of Antarctic territories 
past, present, and also future.34
What ‘treaty sovereignty’ allowed for was a spatial and temporal deferral. On one 
hand, it meant that claimant states such as Australia, Chile, and the UK deferred anxie-
ties of dispossession by re- possessing their territories in the realm of the imaginative and 
 material; by incorporating them into the realm of public education on the one hand and 
on the other by building and maintaining scientific stations. It also facilitated a future- 
orientated intervention with one of the most obvious being the education of young 
children in the public education system, thus ensuring that as adults they were inculcated 
with a sense of how important it was to understand their respective nations as ‘polar’. The 
work of the Argentine political scientist, Carlos Escudé, remains invaluable in highlight-
ing how forms of ‘patriotic education’ doctrines combined with map drawing, scrapbook 
making and the collection of stamps contributed to the making of the young Argentine 
citizen in the here and now and the ‘geographically informed’ citizen of the future.35
RESILIENT ANTARCTIC GEOPOLITICS
Resilience, used frequently in national security planning and disaster management, is in 
the eyes of many analysts one of the most important contemporary political categories. 
With its roots in ecological thought, resilience implies a capacity to ‘bounce back’ from a 
current (and possibly unwelcome) state to a previous state. The catalyst for such resilience 
is often said to be evident in the aftermath of a crisis or trauma such as a natural disaster 
or terrorist attack. What makes resilience appealing to political leaders, moreover, is the 
sense that it stands in contra- distinction to fragility. Resilience is also an imaginative 
process. It embraces a strategic culture of preparedness, which embraces the prospect of 
the emergency in order to better prepare for something that might happen, but also might 
not. As Mark Neocleous contends,
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Resilience is nothing if  not an apprehension of the future, but a future imagined as disaster and 
then, more importantly, recovery from the disaster. In this task resilience plays heavily on its 
origins in systems thinking, explicitly linking security with urban planning, civil contingency 
measures, public health, financial institutions, corporate risk and the environment in a way that 
had previously been incredibly hard for the state to do.36
For the seven claimant states, the future imagined as disaster might be a world where 
their territorial claims were dismissed with little to no thought for the apparent conse-
quences. In a world where the provisions of the Antarctic Treaty no longer applied, the 
geopolitical holding pattern of the last six decades would be no more. Semi- claimants 
such as Russia and the United States might formally articulate and implement de facto 
territorial claims and third parties, state and non- state alike, might decide that exist-
ing prohibitions on mining might no longer apply. A new colonizing impulse might be 
unleashed with a variety of actors engaging in their own space- making projects, oblivious 
to calls for consensus and restraint in mineral resource activities, fishing, military testing, 
and so on.
While popular authors such as Kim Stanley Robinson and Matthew Reilly have imag-
ined an Antarctica punctured by mining operations and/or riddled by conflict, claimant 
states frequently invoke the prospect of disaster or crisis to provoke domestic and interna-
tional audiences.37 In Australia, for example, Chinese research stations being established 
in the AAT in conjunction with Japanese whaling in the Southern Ocean has provoked 
commentators to claim that sovereignty over the AAT is in jeopardy. In both cases, 
notwithstanding the presence of the ATS and relevant actors such as the International 
Whaling Commission, well- placed Australian writers were not shy in imagining disastrous 
futures. Ellie Fogarty of the Lowy Institute for International Policy speculated on the 
following in 2011:
Major powers such as China and Russia have voiced their interest in the continent’s resource 
potential, strongly suggesting the current prohibition of resource exploitation will be revisited 
after 2048. These developments pose a potential threat to the longevity of the Antarctic Treaty 
System as well as Australia’s dormant claim to 42% of the continent. Australia has limited 
Antarctic presence and capability, and posits its policy in terms of science and environmental 
management rather than national security. This raises questions about its ability to preserve its 
sovereignty claim.38
In other words, the last sentence of the quote frames it as a question of resilience. What 
can the claimant state do to ‘preserve its sovereignty claim’ in the face of a looming 
disaster? The disaster being, presumably, Russia and China’s decision to revoke the pro-
hibition on mining in 2048 onwards – the point when the provisions of the Protocol on 
Environmental Protection could be reviewed and possibly annulled. More worryingly, 
however, is the implicit suggestion that major powers such as China might just ‘walk away’ 
if  the ATS no longer suited their purposes.
Other Australian authors have considered the consequences that might follow if  coun-
tries such as China continue to expand their presence in the Antarctic. As Bergin and 
Press contend:
Australia is a major player in Antarctic affairs, but others’ efforts might overtake us soon. If  
we’re to maintain our significant influence on the frozen continent, it’s essential that we expand 
our ability to conduct high quality science, extend the presence that allows for that science to be 
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supported, and grow the logistic capability to deliver and support science . . . Other countries 
have superior capacity to penetrate our territory, and so they do.39
This fear of ‘penetration’, with all its fears of unwanted and gendered violation, is a 
recurring motif  in contemporary Australian geopolitical imagination, provoking in turn 
a cultural reaction that has been termed ‘frontier vigilantism’.40 As Ellie Fogarty noted, 
‘Greater occupation, and the ability to access all of its claimed territory will make it less 
difficult for Australia to argue its case for sovereignty in the future.’41
One response by claimant states such Australia has been to invest in a more resilient 
form of Antarctic geopolitics by promoting themselves as coastal states and advocating 
greater resourcing to extending their presence both above and below sea level.42 Drawing 
inspiration from Article 76 and 77 of the United Nations Law of the Sea Convention 
(UNCLOS) and provisions for extended continental shelf  delimitation, Australia and 
others have invested considerably in mapping and charting the continental shelf  regions 
of their territorial claims in Antarctica and surrounding sub- Antarctic islands. It is a con-
tentious business, as the vast majority of the international community would not register 
the presence of coastal states in Antarctica. The relationship between UNCLOS (which 
came into force in 1994) and the Antarctic Treaty is a work in progress.43 It has created 
opportunities for states with claims to Antarctic coastline, such as Australia, Argentina, 
and the UK, to collect scientific data about their continental shelf  regions and consider 
submitting materials to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf  
(CLCS), which in turn helps to adjudicate on whether a coastal state enjoys further sover-
eign rights over the seabed pertaining to the extended continental shelf. This is a complex, 
time- consuming, and expensive business; and thus far none of the claimant/coastal states 
concerned (with the exception of Argentina) have asked the CLCS to consider their 
respective Antarctic extended continental shelves. Their deferral is rooted in caution – a 
concern that to take an active position would be seen as provocative to other parties to 
the ATS which believe that land and sea- based claims to territory should be deferred for 
the duration of the treaty and its provisions.44
This deferral, however, is complicit with a resilient Antarctic geopolitics. In other 
words, there is a conviction that any collapse in the ATS can be mitigated and even 
recovered from if  information on extended continental shelves is archived and stored. 
When Australia presented its submission in 2004 to the CLCS, it was publicly noted 
that they asked the UN body not to consider their materials pertaining to the AAT. It 
was a deliberate partial submission, but one which reserved the right to submit further 
materials in due course. As with other claimant states such as Chile, New Zealand, and 
the UK, this partial submission strategy was an exercise in preparedness. What might the 
claimant/coastal state do in the event of the collapse of the ATS? The answer appeared 
to be it would submit further materials to the CLCS in the hope, if  not expectation, that 
this UN body might issue non- binding ‘recommendations’ which would help to bolster a 
sense of de facto territorial sovereignty over the Antarctic seabed. In reality, the CLCS is 
a  scientific–technical body with no legal competence, but, nonetheless, the hope appears 
to lie in this body to grant an imprimatur of sorts.45
A further vignette illustrative of another form of resilient Antarctic geopolitics lies 
in the bilateral relationship between Argentina and Britain. Both countries have faced 
the prospect of the relationship turning towards disaster, never more so than from April 
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to June 1982 when the fate of the Falkland/Malvinas Islands hung in the balance. Since 
those hostilities, both countries have been engaged in a ‘proxy war’ in and around the 
sub- Antarctic islands of the Falklands and South Georgia, clashing over defence, fishing, 
oil and gas exploration, and tourism. The 2013 referendum in the Falkland Islands was 
another moment of geopolitical tension as voters overwhelmingly expressed support for a 
political future shaped by a constitutional relationship with the UK. Both countries have 
invested strongly in building and maintaining political relationships with other South 
American states such as Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay.
In 2012, a situation of a different kind that many took as a looming disaster provoked 
a renewed interest in how resilient the UK’s Antarctic presence might be in the future. 
The source of this anxiety was the decision by the Natural Environment Research Council 
(NERC), a major British funding body, to propose a merger between the British Antarctic 
Survey (BAS) and the National Oceanography Centre. What followed was an intense 
period of media and parliamentary scrutiny, with supporters of BAS contending that any 
merger would weaken the UK’s capacity not only to conduct polar science (as a result of 
rationalization of resources) but also to act as a high- profile geopolitical agent in a con-
tested region of Antarctica. The House of Commons Science and Technology Committee 
concluded that the proposed merger was misguided. The merger was subsequently aban-
doned and the future of BAS as a stand- alone institution reaffirmed by the then Science 
Minister, David Willetts. Two months later, the then Foreign Secretary, William Hague, 
stood in front of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and announced that a large part 
of British Antarctic Territory would be renamed Queen Elizabeth Land in honour of the 
Queen’s fiftieth Jubilee Year.46
While the objects of anxiety vary from Australian worries about Chinese activities on 
the polar continent to the naming practices of the UK in the face of geopolitical compe-
tition from Argentina, these vignettes hint at a collective concern for preparedness and 
resilience. How can the claimant state make itself  more resilient in a world where Antarctic 
geopolitics appears to be more riddled with arguments over scientific whaling, fisheries 
management, and the establishment of marine protection areas in the Southern Ocean?47 
China, Russia, and the Ukraine are routinely cited as examples of non- claimant states 
who are eager to exploit Antarctica in the here and now (fish) and in the future (minerals). 
In Australia, the government released an independent plan for Australia’s policy options 
over the next twenty years in Antarctica in late 2014. For two Australian academics, the 
report was welcome because,
As explained above, others countries do have their eyes focused on Antarctica. Should a non- 
party to the Treaty arrive on the continent with non- scientific or non- peaceful intentions, then 
it is likely politics and international customary law will be used to prevent that non- party taking 
any actions that were contrary to the spirit and intent of the Treaty. In the most unlikely event 
that the Treaty should end, then any rival claimant will need to submit to a competitive process 
with Australia, bettering its long- standing history of effective occupation. Broader, untested 
arguments of common heritage aside, it is unlikely that another country could defeat Australia’s 
claim.48
Or so it is hoped, at least.
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CONCLUSIONS
This chapter has considered how Antarctic geopolitics might be considered explicitly 
through the logic of anticipation and whether it might be possible to imagine three 
 variants – characterized by anticipation, deferral, and resilience. In each case, the relation-
ship to the future is critical in driving ideas and actions in the proverbial here and now.49 
For interested parties in the 1950s, there was a hopeful future in which international col-
laboration might be possible through science and scientists; which if  sufficiently robust 
might anticipate another possible future involving further territorial claiming by the 
superpowers, nuclear testing and dumping, secret Soviet missile launch sites and the inten-
sification of Cold War geopolitics, and conflict over strategic stores of minerals such as 
uranium.50 Contemporaries had imagined that all of these scenarios were eminently pos-
sible. The Antarctic Treaty was about deferring those aforementioned futures and delib-
erately did not seek to resolve the toughest issues, such as ownership of natural resources 
and territory. Finally, the chapter identified a resilient form of Antarctic geopolitics, with 
an attendant interest in how the ATS has coped with ‘shocks’ and its capacity to ‘bounce 
back’ from hints of unwelcome futures including conflict over fishing, marine manage-
ment, and scientific whaling. As the Antarctic becomes subject to ever greater demands 
to better manage, regulate, and understand it, so too will it become ever more important 
to understand how Antarctic geopolitics mutates in the present and in the future.
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